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Astrada & Astrada

REEXAMINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE BINARY: POLITICS,
IDENTITY, AND LAW
Marvin L. Astrada & Scott B. Astrada*
ABSTRACT
Politicized identity, which finds expression in the law, is binarybased. In light of the role that it plays in national political and legal
debates triggered by various groups challenging identity-based binaries,
this article reexamines the integrity of the binary that lies at the core of
how courts construe legal identity. Basic-identity binaries have and
continue to play a profound role in legal thought and practice. This
article thus explores the relationship and tension between law and
binary-based identity signifiers. We explore the notion that the law’s
use of the binary-based identity signifier is premised on antiquated
assumptions and simplified schemata that, to better recognize rights and
apply judicial remedies and protections of individuals and groups that
fall outside the binary, will perhaps require the courts to adopt a more
flexible approach to identity. Politicized identity may be at the heart of
contestations between those who wish to preserve and those who wish
to obliterate basic binaries, but the law is a special case and will be
uniquely affected by the fallout that results from this process. We thus
employ case law and concepts from philosophy and legal theory to flesh
out an emerging problem in the law. Our intent in this paper is to
reexamine the basic binary nature of legal identity, the components and
dynamics that undergird it, the consequences that result from its
application, and the tensions and challenges that result from rejecting
the integrity of the binary within law.
INTRODUCTION
In the present political environment, politicized identity
encompasses a variety of disparate and passionate debates over the form
and substance of public policy, from who is legally allowed to use which
gendered public bathroom to reformulating trade policy from an
“America First” perspective.1 Recently, politicized identity has fueled
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widespread social protests (and counter-protests) against political
parties, the Administration, and political or cultural entities such as the
“media” or “Hollywood.”2 A major driver of identity-based protest and
resistance in the present has been the Trump Administration’s
sociocultural, economic, and political agenda—one that is firmly rooted
in traditional notions of societal order in place before the late 1960s.3
Indeed, the proclaimed agenda to “Make America Great Again”
involves breathing life into traditional sociocultural binaries that
underpinned identity, such as White/Black,4 Citizen/Alien,5 and
Male/Female,6 and the corresponding privilege of one half of the binary
over the other. Resistance to this agenda is based, in part, on the
realization that a transition back toward traditional binaries is
problematic and potentially harmful.7 In fact, traditional binaries have
historically been the basis for exclusionary, if not discriminatory, public
policy.8 In light of the modern historical struggle against identity-based
binaries that began in the 1960s, and recent resistance and protests
1

See America First Foreign Policy, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-foreign-policy (last visited Dec. 23, 2017);
America First Energy Plan, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/americafirst-energy (last visited Dec. 23, 2017).
2
See Emanuella Grinberg & Madison Park, Second Day of Protests over Trump's
Immigration Policies, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017, 1:42 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/us-immigration-protests/index.html.
3
See Gregory Krieg, Donald Trump Reveals when He Thinks America was Great,
CNN (Mar. 28, 2016, 5:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/26/politics/donaldtrump-when-america-was-great/index.html.
4
See Jonathan Mahler, Donald Trump’s Message Resonates with White
Supremacists, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/us/politics/donald-trump-supremacists.html.
5
See Anna Brand, Donald Trump: I Would Force Mexico to Build Border Wall,
MSNBC (June 28, 2015, 2:11 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/donald-trump-iwould-force-mexico-build-border-wall.
6
See Molly Ball, What Kind of Man is Donald Trump?, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 8,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/donald-trump-and-thewomen/503402/.
7
See, e.g., 100 Ways, in 100 Days, that Trump Has Hurt Americans, CENTER FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/general/news/2017/04/26/431299/100ways-100-days-trump-hurt-americans/.
8
See generally Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology Is Fiction,
Racism as a Social Problem Is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives on
the Social Construction of Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 16 (2005) (discussing the
role of race in conversations about the differences between groups).
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centered on racial, ethnic, sex/gender, and socio-economic critiques of
societal order, traditional binary-based identities require
reexamination.9 In particular, it is necessary to reevaluate the
underlying assumptions and effects of a binary-based cultural and social
identity matrix, as well as what place, if any, binary-based identity
signifiers have in the present.10
As the defining ethos of the current Administration, the return
of the U.S. to an idyllic time where identities were concrete and selfcontained is based, in part, on interjecting traditional identity-based
binaries with renewed energy and legitimacy in the realm of law and
public policy. Consider, for instance, the legal and public policy debate
that took place over which public restrooms transgender individuals
must use in North Carolina—and the previous (Obama) and current
(Trump) Administrations’ antipodal reactions to the matter.11 The
bathroom controversy reveals a deeper tension that is emerging in the
law regarding the role of politicized identity in the legal and policy
realms.12 Other states, such as Texas, also considered pursuing
9

See Krieg, supra note 3.
See Oregon First US State to Add Third Gender Option on Driver ID, BBC (June
16, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40309362 (“Beginning in
July, Oregon residents who do not identify as male or female can mark X for sex on
driver's licenses, learner's permits and state IDs.”); Casey Parks, Oregon Court
Allows Person to Change Sex from “Female” to “Non-Binary,” THE
OREGONIAN/OREGONLIVE (June 10, 2016),
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2016/06/oregon_court_allows_person
_to.html (detailing In the Matter of Sex Change of Jamie Shupe, wherein an Oregon
Circuit Court found “that a transgender person can legally change their sex to ‘nonbinary’ rather than male or female in what legal experts believe is a first in the
United States. Multnomah County Circuit Court Judge Amy Holmes Hehn legally
changed 52-year-old Jamie Shupe's sex from ‘female’ to non-binary.”).
11
See Sandhya Somashekhar, et al., Trump Administration Rolls Back Protections
for Transgender Students, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-administration-rolls-backprotections-for-transgender-students/2017/02/22/550a83b4-f913-11e6-bf01d47f8cf9b643_story.html?utm_term=.469f6b2bb7ee.
12
See e.g., Daniel Trotta, Trump Revokes Obama Guidelines on Transgender
Bathrooms, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trumplgbt-idUSKBN161243; Katy Steinmetz, President Trump Just Rolled Back
Guidelines That Protected Transgender Students, TIME (Feb. 23, 2017),
http://time.com/4679063/donald-trump-transgender-bathroom/ (At the time of this
writing, the North Carolina legislature repealed the so-called bathroom bill and the
Governor signed off on the repeal.); Mark Berman & Amber Phillips, North
Carolina Governor Signs Bill Repealing and Replacing Transgender Bathroom Law
10
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legislation to emplace people within a traditional Male/Female identity
binary.13
In light of the role that politicized identity is playing in the
present,14 and the national political and legal debates that have been
triggered by various groups challenging the integrity of identity-based
binaries,15 this article examines the fundamental conflict between the
reactionary move toward reestablishing identity-based binaries (and
their underlying assumptions), and resistance to such binaries, and
contends that as the American polity has become increasingly more
diverse,
traditional
binaries
such
as
Male/Female,
Heterosexual/Homosexual, and Black/White, have become
representationally inadequate. American society has become more
politically diversified along racial, ethnic, and sex/gender identity lines,
and the culturally homogenous norm of the “average American” has
drastically shifted since the late 1960s.16
The conflict between those adhering to traditional binaries and
those questioning the assumptions underlying said binaries can be
readily observed in law and public policy.17 Indeed, law plays a central
role in these present conflicts, as many of the actions taken and policies
advanced by the current Administration are being challenged in the
Amid Criticism, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/03/30/north-carolinalawmakers-say-theyve-agreed-on-a-deal-to-repeal-the-bathroombill/?utm_term=.25638df206ad.
13
See e.g., Katy Steinmetz, Texas Senate Approves Controversial Bathroom Bill
After Five-Hour Debate, TIME (Mar. 15, 2017), http://time.com/4701658/texassenate-bathroom-bill-sb6-transgender/; Anti-Transgender Law Map, EQUALITY
FED’N, http://www.equalityfederation.org/lac/antitrans/ (showing several other states
other states are currently considering similar bills) (last visited Dec. 23, 2017).
14
See supra notes 8–11.
15
See supra notes 17–18.
16
See generally Robert D. Putnam, E pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in
the Twenty‐First Century: The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, 30 SCANDINAVIAN
POL. STUD. 137 (2007) (discussing the long and short-term effects on communities
as a result of sharp increases in immigration); Jean S. Phinney & Anthony D. Ong,
Conceptualization and Measurement of Ethnic Identity: Current Status and Future
Directions, 54 J. OF COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY 271
(2007) (exploring how individuals understand their ethnic identities); Rodney, E.
Hero & Caroline J. Tolbert, Racial/Ethnic Diversity Interpretation of Politics and
Policy in the States of the U.S., 40 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 851, 856–59 (1996).
17
See, e.g., Chris Dolan, Letting Go of the Gender Binary: Charting New Pathways
for Humanitarian Interventions on Gender-Based Violence, 849 INT’L REV. OF THE
RED CROSS 485, 488 (2015).
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courts.18 Legal challenges to identity-based binaries have resulted in
exposing a complex relationship between the courts’ reliance on binarybased constructs to administer justice,19 and combatting discriminatory
policies and practices.20 Ironically, in an age of increasing rejection of
binary-based identity signifiers, the courts have relied on legal schema
that utilize such signifiers to protect vulnerable and marginalized
communities.21
We therefore utilize select case law, such as Footnote Four of United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,22 to illustrate and explore the deep
binary-based nature of identity-based jurisprudence to further examine
and discuss the conflicts between the basic binary nature of legal
identity, the components and dynamics that undergird it, the
consequences that result from its application, and the tensions and
challenges that result from rejecting the integrity of the binary within
law.23 This article’s reexamination of the integrity of the binary is
designed to foster critical reflection and debate; it seeks to provoke
discussion on whether it is desirable to scrap the binary, retain it, or if
possible to apply it in the law to reflect changes in the make-up of
society.24 Going forward, we discuss the politics and complexity of
18

See, e.g., Meridith Mcgraw et al., A Timeline of Trump's Immigration Executive
Order and Legal Challenges, ABC NEWS (June 29, 2017),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-president-trumps-immigration-executiveorder-legal-challenges/story?id=45332741.
19
Smith v. Avanti, 249 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1200–01 (D. Colo. 2017).
20
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the affirmative
action admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School because the
University had a compelling interest in pursuing a race-conscious admissions
process that may favor underrepresented minority groups.); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
US 1 (1948) (holding that courts cannot constitutionally enforce racial covenants on
real estate).
21
See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 155 n.4 (1938) (positing
that discrete and insular minorities may require heightened judicial protection).
22
Id.
23
See Tara Dunnavant, Bye-Bye Binary: Transgender Prisoners and the Regulation
of Gender in the Law, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 15, 16–17, 20, 32, 35 (2016).
24
Despite the Trump Administration’s promises to further entrench the binary, a
recent ruling from the District Court of Massachusetts, Kosilek v. Spencer illustrates
how the law is reassessing the binary-based identity signifiers that have been relied
upon to make sense of juridical subjects. 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d
en banc, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). The Kosilek court found that the Department of
Corrections violated the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment”
clause in refusing to provide gender confirmation surgery to prisoner Michelle
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identity within the law to contextualize the binary.25 We then examine
the relationship between politicized identity, culture, and the binarybased nature of identity in the law.26 The complex relationship between
the binary, identity, and the juridical subject is then critically
examined.27 We analyze and discuss the power dynamics and
consequences of employing the binary in law.28 Lastly, we conclude our
reexamination of the integrity of the binary in the administration of
justice.29
I. THE INTEGRITY OF THE BINARY – THE POLITICS & COMPLEXITY
OF IDENTITY IN THE LAW
A. Contextualizing the Binary in the Law: Constructing Legal
Identity
This section explores the role of the binary in law, and the
conceptual integrity of the binary that lies at the core of legal identity
Kosilek, and granted injunctive relief for Kosilek to receive the surgery. Id. at 251.
This case exemplifies how recent challenges to the binary nature of identity are
affecting judicial remedies and protections. Notably, the Kosilek decision — which
was overturned on appeal— is unique in its expansion of the scope of judicial
remedies and protections under law. Despite being overturned, the decision is
indicative of why, going forward, it is important to ask what insight can be gained by
critically reexamining entrenched binary-based identity signifiers, especially in the
context of civil rights and identity in the law. Dunnavant, supra note 23, at 15–16
(“The [Kosilek] decision represented the first time a U.S. prison was court ordered to
provide a transgender prisoner with this type of surgery.”). Although it was
overturned, the decision is nevertheless instructive on discussions of binary-based
identities and their use in the law. Dunnavant notes that, “Judge Thompson, in her
dissenting opinion, criticizes the majority for employing de novo review to the
highly factual issue of deliberate indifference, instead of a deferential, clear error
standard. If the court had employed the proper standard, according to Thompson,
they would have accepted the district court’s factual determinations, as the majority
of experts in the case concurred that gender confirmation surgery was medically
necessary for Kosilek and the evidence presented at trial provided ample support for
the district court’s conclusions.” Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
25
See infra Part I.
26
See infra Part II
27
See infra Part III.
28
See infra Part IV.
29
See infra Conclusion.
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that the courts have traditionally employed to adjudicate cases. The
intent is to emphasize the importance of revisiting the binary as it is
conceptualized and applied in law. First, it is necessary to define some
key terms employed in the remainder of this work. The basic unit of
analysis vis-à-vis the binary is that of the “juridical subject.”30 In its
most basic form, a juridical subject is a doctrinal entity “endowed with
juridical personality who [is] usually known as a collective person,
social person, or legal entity.”31 A subject has rights and obligations
under law, and may qualify for judicial protections if the courts find that
a subject falls within a specified legal classification, e.g., “discrete and
insular minority.”32 A “legal identity” is comprised of the space within
which the subject and the law interact; it is an identity that is conferred
upon the subject by law, e.g., race and ethnicity as legal classifications
that entitle a subject to claim the protections of identity-based
legislation.33 Lastly, a “non-binary identity” is one in which the subject
As used in this work, “subject” is shorthand for juridical subject.
Elvia Arcelia Quintana Adriano, The Natural Person, Legal Entity or Juridical
Person and Juridical Personality, 4 PENN. ST. J. OF L. & INT'L AFF. 363, 366 (2015).
“The elements that contribute to the formation of a legal person are the following:
 Existence of a being or subject: A subject of law is any being capable to
act as holder of powers, or liable with obligations in a juridical relationship.
The term subject of law or juridical being alludes to an unspecified person
in terms of strict law.
 Will of the subject or being. The action of a subject with the intention of
producing certain legal effects, and should be highlighted its importance for
the law, since this will should be also expressed in an appropriate manner to
produce legal consequences.
 Subjective rights. This refers to the power of the juridical norms which is
granted to express or omit certain conduct that ensures the judicial
protection
 Juridical personality . . .
 Obligations. The obligation is understood as the existing juridical bond
between the demand of a subjective right by its holder and the duty to fulfill
the conduct based on the norm that is imposed on the other subject who
belongs to the relationship … In the juridical field, the word personality has
several meanings. It is often used to indicate the quality of a person to be
considered as a center of juridical norms or as a subject of rights and
obligations.” Id. at 375–76.
32
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 155 n.4 (1938).
33
See, e.g., Village of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 607 (2d Cir. 2016)
(holding that, under federal law, “Hispanic” qualifies as a “race” when determining
if a plaintiff can be afforded protection from discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964). More specifically, the Second Circuit considered the
30
31
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is not encased within a clear biaxial This/That classification, category,
or structure.34 A subject is therefore not immured in a racial, ethnic, sex,
gender, or other identity category that is fundamentally binary-based.
Legal identity lays out the relationship between the State and the
juridical subject.35 From the founding, when various human beings were
not fully recognized as human in the fundamental law as expounded
upon in the initial U.S. Constitution—such as African slaves, Native
Americans, women, and children—to the post-Civil War era, and
continuing through to the present, identity has played a key role in the
evolution of the law and its relationship to those it ostensibly serves.36
In the present time, however, it seems that there are major developments
occurring on the domestic sociocultural and political stages which are
premised on either substantially modifying, e.g., the inclusion of the
LGBTQ identity group into the traditional heterosexual-based
Male/Female marriage institution,37 or eradiating, e.g., the notion of our
society being at the threshold of moving beyond He/She,38 the
question of whether or not “Hispanic” constitutes a racial category when interpreting
Title VII Id. at 606–07. The court, relying on the interpretation that ethnicity is a
race for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and held that the same should hold true for
purposes of Title VII. Id. at 607. See Scott B. Astrada & Marvin L. Astrada, Being
Latino in the 21st Century: Reexamining Politicized Identity & the Problem of
Representation, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 247–48 (2017).
34
See, e.g., Karen Kopelson, Dis/Integrating the Gay/Queer Binary: ‘Reconstructed
Identity Politics’ for a Performative Pedagogy, 65 COLLEGE ENGLISH 17, 28 (2002).
35
See, e.g., The Combahee River Collective, Combahee River Collective: A Black
Feminist Statement, 9 OFF OUR BACKS INC. 6, 6–8 (1979).
36
See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(prohibiting racial segregation of public schools); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31
(1962) (prohibiting racial segregation of interstate and intrastate transportation
facilities); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that state laws prohibiting
inter-racial marriage are unconstitutional); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 392 U.S.
409 (1968) (holding that federal law bars all racial discrimination (private or public)
in the sale or rental of property); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (finding that a
city school system's failure to provide English language instruction to students of
Chinese ancestry amounted to unlawful discrimination); Regents of the Univ. of.
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that a public university may take race
into account as a factor in admissions decisions); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986) (finding that a state denies Black defendants equal protection when members
of his/her race have been purposefully excluded from a jury).
37
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
38
See Katy Steinmetz, Beyond 'He' or 'She', TIME (Mar. 16, 2017),
http://time.com/4703058/time-cover-story-beyond-he-or-she/ (“In state legislatures,
lawmakers are . . . debating the very meaning of the words sex and gender in debates
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traditional binary basis upon which legal identity has been premised.39
This especially seems to be the case since the emergence of the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s, itself premised on the
integrity of a binary racial identity signifier (Black, the antithesis of its
polar opposite, White).40
Many aspects of a subject’s social and legal reality—rights,
freedoms, responsibilities, duties, and obligations—are directly
impacted when courts interpret identity-based legislation, broadly
construed.41 Law, in the form of judicial interpretation, has been
employed to recognize and confer legal status, protections, and benefits
upon those who fall within certain identity-based group
classifications.42 Race, ethnicity, and sexuality are exemplars of
identity-based signifiers that manifest in the law.43 The law is able to
recognize and infuse such signifiers with substantive benefits and
protections.44 Examples would be affirmative action programs designed
to remedy past racial discrimination and the designation of racially
motivated criminal conduct as felonious.45 These programs and laws
exist because identity-signifiers, at the most basic level, are ostensibly
based on and rooted in a binary opposition.46 That is, each of the
over so-called ‘bathroom bills.’ Lawsuits alleging that sexual orientation and gender
identity are covered under bans on sex discrimination are fleshing out the meaning of
that word too. But it is clear that for many people these binaries are bedrocks they
will fight to defend.”).
39
See generally David Taylor, Social Identity and Social Policy: Engagements with
Postmodern Theory, 27 J. SOC. POL’Y. 329 (1998) (arguing for the importance of the
concept of social identity in contemporary analyses of social policy).
40
Roy L. Brooks & Kirsten Widner, In Defense of the Black/White Binary:
Reclaiming a Tradition of Civil Rights Scholarship, 12 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. &
POL'Y 107, 117–18 (2010).
41
See Taylor, supra note 39.
42
See, e.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (finding that racial segregation
of interstate or intrastate transportation facilities is a litigable issue); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenge in a criminal case dismissing jurors without stating a valid cause for doing
so may not be used to exclude jurors based solely on their race).
43
See generally KATHERINE J. ROSICH, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (Am. Soc. Ass’n ed., 2007) (discussing racial and ethnic
disparities in the criminal justice system).
44
Id.
45
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 42.
46
See, e.g., Fisher v. U. of Tex. (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (holding that the
lower court had not applied the standard of strict scrutiny, articulated in Grutter v.
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foregoing signifiers is correlated to a specific identity group that exists,
in part, by virtue of shared experiences and traits that devolve from
being paired with an opposite. Prominent binaries that the law has
employed and concretized in legal discourse include Black/White,
Heterosexual/Homosexual, and Male/Female, to name a few.47 These
are some basic binaries that, though they have been complicated by
efforts to broaden the scope of inclusion or clarify the nuances of subidentities that are subsumed by the basic binary, continue to provide the
judicial expositors of law with a primary basis for the administration of
justice.
In light of recent history, from the late 1960s through the
present, especially with the establishment of modern politicized identity
groups challenging the power dynamics and composition of the
traditional identity binary, it seemed that the basic identity binary,
because of its simplicity and distortionary effects, was on its way to
becoming an outdated construct. One of the most radical challenges to
the binary notion of oppression and revolt, for instance, was the
Combahee River Collective, a Black feminist lesbian organization
active in Boston from 1974 to 1980.48 The Collective articulated a
viable sub-identity within the mainstream feminist movement, which
was comprised primarily of white women, and based, in large part, on
Male/Female, White/Black, and Heterosexual/Homosexual identity
Bollinger and Regents of the U. of Cal. v. Bakke, to its admissions program. The
Court's ruling in Fisher I took Grutter and Bakke as given and did not directly revisit
the constitutionality of using race as a factor in college admissions); Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (holding that a state may punish offenders more
harshly when considering whether a crime was committed or initially considered due
to an intended victim's status in a protected class).
47
There are numerous examples of the Court’s use of binary-based identity as a
basis for articulating and adjudicating identity-based cases. See, e.g., Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004) (expounding on the able-bodied/disabled
dichotomy); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–85 (1973) (detailing
historical sex-based distinctions memorialized in the Court’s jurisprudence such as
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 142 (1873)). It should also be noted that, while the
binary provides the super-structure of the juridical enterprise—Guilty/Not Guilty in
criminal adjudication, for instance—we are very much aware that variegated
permutations have emerged and that the binary is far more complex in actuality than
a purely biaxial framework upon which law, politics, and public policy are based.
48
See Wini Breines, What’s Love Got to Do with It? White Women, Black Women,
and Feminism in the Movement Years, 27 J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC’Y
1095, 1095–96 (2002) (discussing the importance of the Combahee River Statement
in Black feminism).
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binaries.49 Although challenges to and rejection of traditional binarybased identity signifiers persist in the 21st century, the binary has proven
quite resilient.
Certain indicators point to a trend toward rejecting basic identity
binaries and signifiers. Specifically, millennials tend to reject traditional
basic identity binaries, especially in the realms of gender, sexuality, and
race/ethnicity.50 Similarly, there are calls for minorities (and sub-groups
within minorities) to be distinguished from an overarching umbrella
identity and receive equal treatment under law as far as legal benefits
and protections are concerned.51 Macro- and micro-scale resistance in
the form of rejecting gender and sexuality identities—blurring the lines
between and among identities, as well as rejecting pronouns that reflect
a basic binary, e.g., replacing Latino/Latina with LatinX52—seem to be
indicative of a trend wherein basic identity-signifiers are being
discarded for alternative formulations of identity.53 Identities once
considered viable and concrete in the recent past, such as sexuality,
gender, race, and ethnicity, seem to be quite fluid, and perhaps not

49

The Combahee River Collective, Combahee River Collective: A Black Feminist
Statement, 9 OFF OUR BACKS INC. 6, 6–8 (1979).
50
Jacqueline J. Kacen, Girrrl Power and Boyyy Nature: The Past, Present, and
Paradisal Future of Consumer Gender Identity, 18 MKTG. INTELLIGENCE & PLAN.
345, 345–46 (2000); PEW RES. CENTER, MILLENNIALS: CONFIDENT. CONNECTED.
OPEN TO CHANGE (Feb. 2010),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confident-connectedopen-to-change.pdf.
51
See Marjua Estevez, Can Afro-Latinos Please Move Beyond The “I’m Black, Too”
Rhetoric?, VIBE (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.vibe.com/2016/11/afro-latinos-beyondim-black-too/.
52
Vanessa Reyes, More Than Just an Image: Pop Culture Representations of
Latinxs and the Immigration Debate, AUGUSTANA DIGITAL COMMONS (Feb. 18,
2015), http://digitalcommons.augustana.edu/mabryaward/1/.
53
See generally JUDITH S. KAUFMAN & DAVID A. POWELL, The Meaning of Sexual
Identity in the Twenty-First Century, in THE MEANING OF SEXUAL IDENTITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Judith S. Kaufman & David A. Powell eds., 2014); Darryl
Fears, Rejecting Race as an Identity, LA TIMES (Apr. 23, 1999),
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/apr/23/news/mn-30243; Karen L. Suvemoto,
Redefining “Asian American” Identity: Reflections on Differentiating Ethnic and
Racial Identities for Asian American Individuals and Communities, in ASIAN
AMERICANS: VULNERABLE POPULATIONS, MODEL INTERVENTIONS, AND CLARIFYING
AGENDAS 115–26 (Lin Zhan ed., 2002).

Astrada & Astrada

184

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 17:2

amenable to the present sociocultural and political actuality as we head
into the mid-21st century.54
The recent election, however, seems to challenge this trend, and
can be viewed as an attempt by the Administration to pander to and base
public policy on select identity groups’ interests, such as White working
class and White rural Americans, that have been based on the integrity
of binary-based identity signifiers.55 Basic identity-based signifiers
such as Pro (Patriot)/Anti-American, White/Non-White, Citizen/NonCitizen, and Self-reliant/Welfare recipient,56 seem to be at the heart of
the present Administration’s sociopolitical, sociocultural, and economic
agendas.57
B. Law, Binaries, and the Administration of Justice
In addition to the political and public policy realms, the law, in
particular, has relied upon identity binaries in fashioning legal tools. For
example, the federal judiciary uses them to assess race-based
54

Supra notes 50–53.
See Rich Morin, Behind Trump’s Win in Rural White America: Women Joined
Men in Backing Him, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 17, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/17/behind-trumps-win-in-ruralwhite-america-women-joined-men-in-backing-him/.
56
President Trump recently stated: “I just don’t want a poor person” in the
billionaire-laden cabinet. “‘Somebody said, ‘Why’d you appoint rich person to be in
charge of the economy,’ said Trump, a billionaire himself. ‘I said, ‘Because that’s
the kind of thinking we want.’” “‘They’re representing the country. They don’t want
the money. They’re representing the country. They had to give up a lot to take these
jobs. They gave up a lot,’ he said.” Eugene Scott, Trump: ‘I Just Don't Want a Poor
Person’ in Cabinet Economic Jobs, CNN (June 22, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/22/politics/donald-trump-poor-personcabinet/index.html.
57
The Trump Administration has tried to push national security-based travel bans
and border wall policies explicitly premised on politicized identity as well as
socioeconomic policies premised on particular politicized identity groups. See, e.g.,
Exec. Order No. 13788, 82 Fed. Reg. 18837 (Apr. 18, 2017) (Exec. Order on Buy
American and Hire American); Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6,
2017) (Exec. Order on The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United
States); Exec. Order No. 13795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815 (Apr. 28, 2017) (Exec. Order
Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy); Traci Tong, Will the
Travel Ban and Building a Wall Fix America's Immigration Problems?, PRI’S THE
WORLD (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-03-07/will-travel-ban-andbuilding-wall-fix-americas-immigration-problems.
55
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preferential programs in education and employment,58 and applies strict
scrutiny to race-based litigation to adjudicate claims based on identity.59
These developments have been viewed, generally speaking, positively,
and reflect a strategy of inclusion of the Other that can be traced back
to the NAACP’s use of the federal courts to recognize and reify a
distinctly racial (Black contrasted with White) American identity that
the law was required to recognize and protect.60 Identities, especially
those premised on basic binary signifiers such as Black/White,
Equal/Unequal, and Segregated/Integrated, resulted in the law being
able to fashion legal tools and remedies to identify and protect those
who belonged to legally cognizable and protected groups.61
Yet, it seems that identities in the present have become more
complex, fragmented, disparate, and expansively inclusive—to the
point where the idea of identity may have become overly porous, easily
breached, or so nuanced with sub-identities that the initial basic binary
loses its integrity, coherency, and fails to provide clear criteria for
defining any discernable identity.62 Perhaps the most prevalent problem
with legally redefining identity is defining it in a way that will withstand
The Court has declared that race-based affirmative action programs, “imposed by
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995); see also Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that
affirmative action programs are only permitted when there is a showing that the
program’s aim is to eliminate effects of past discrimination).
59
See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int’l. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 474
(1986) (“The purpose of affirmative action is . . . to dismantle prior patterns of
employment discrimination and to prevent discrimination in the future.”).
60
See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
61
This is a practice with a long history. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
(holding unanimously that a Louisville, Ky. city ordinance, prohibiting the sale of
real property to blacks in white-majority neighborhoods or buildings and vice versa,
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's protections for freedom (liberty) of contract).
62
An extreme example of this phenomenon is the case of Rachel Dolezal, a racially
white woman who claims to be trans-racial, and for whom, it appears, Black and
Blackness are not socially constructed states of affairs premised on empirical
experience and physical traits but which possess an immanent realness, substance,
that defies the binary logic of the traditional Black/White or White/Other racial
binaries. Chris McGreal, Rachel Dolezal: “I wasn't identifying as black to upset
people. I was being me,” THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/13/rachel-dolezal-i-wasntidentifying-as-black-to-upset-people-i-was-being-me.
58
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the test of time. Justice Traynor’s opinion in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,63 which addresses the difficulty
in assigning a singular meaning to a particular word, can also be applied
to the inherent problem in attempting to fix concepts and designations:
If words had absolute and constant references, it might be
possible to discover . . . intention in the words themselves and
in the manner in which they were arranged. Words, however, do
not have absolute and constant referents . . . The meaning of
particular words or groups of words varies with the . . . “verbal
context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in view of
the linguistic education and experience of their users and their
hearers or readers (not excluding judges) . . . A word has no
meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an
objective meaning, one true meaning.64
Law, and the courts interpreting the law, have traditionally
relied upon oversimplified, politicized identity-binaries that inform
identity-signifiers.65 This is significant because, as a celebrated observer
of American politics has noted,
[s]carcely any question arises in the United States that does not
become, sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate; hence all
parties are obliged to borrow, in their daily controversies, the
ideas, and even the language, usual in judicial proceedings . . . .
The language of the law thus becomes, in some measure, a
vulgar tongue; the spirit of the law, which is produced in . . . the
courts of justice, gradually penetrates beyond their walls into the

63

442 P.2d 641 (1968).
Id. at 644–45 (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the
Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 187 (1965)).
65
See DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS 14–15 (2d ed. 2007) (“Focusing
on linguistic signs (such as words), Saussure defined a sign as being composed of a
‘signifier’ (signifiant) and a ‘signified’ (signifié). Contemporary commentators tend
to describe the signifier as the form that the sign takes and the signified as the
concept to which it refers.”). An identity signifier is thus comprised of a signifier,
e.g., Black, Gay, or Latino, and a signified concept, e.g., Racial, Sexual, or Ethnic
Identity.
64
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bosom of society, . . . so that at last the whole people contracts
the habits and the tastes of the judicial magistrate.66
The parallel contexts, legal and social, exist alongside each
other, continuously influencing and acting upon each other. 67 As a
result, some sub-identities that have not been integrated are subjugated,
and exist on the periphery of the binary, while others are in essence
silenced because they are unable to be expressed in the dominant
context.68 The binary nature of identity, which includes the political and
the legal, establishes what Michel Foucault has termed “grids of
specification,” which he defines as “the systems according to which the
different ‘kinds of [knowledge] are divided, contrasted, related,
regrouped, classified, derived from one another as objects of …
discourse.’”69 Identity emerges within these grids, which we conceive
of as binaries. These binaries delineate and make “real” the abstract
space in which the law processes identity-based cases and
controversies.70 The federal courts’ racial and civil rights jurisprudence,
such as gauging the constitutionality of affirmative action programs in
higher education, is a prime example of this space.71
The binary nature of the legal subject limits how one can define
one’s self in lived social experience.72 The essential “tradeoff” between
the efficiency of the binary and its inclusive nature, is that the law, in
66

1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 301–02 (Henry Reeve
trans., D. Appleton & Co. 1904).
67
See, e.g., Megan Davidson, Seeking Refuge Under the Umbrella: Inclusion,
Exclusion, and Organizing Within the Category Transgender, 4 SEXUALITY RES.
AND SOC. POL’Y 60, 75 (2007).
68
Id.
69
MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 42 (1982). “[G]rids of
specification: these are the systems according to which the different 'kinds of
[knowledge] are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one
another as objects of . . . discourse.” Id.
70
Id.
71
See David L. Gregory & Sarah Mannix, Past as Prologue in the Affirmative Action
Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court: Reflections on Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin and Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 89 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 499, 546 (2015).
72
See The Trouble With Diversity: An Argument Between Walter Benn Michaels And
Katha Pollitt. Scott Stossel Moderates. The Atlantic Day of Ideas, N. Y. Public
Library, South Court Auditorium, LIVE FROM THE NYPL (Nov. 18, 2006),
http://www.newyorkpubliclibrary.com/sites/default/files/events/diversity111806.pdf.
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its limitation of perceiving juridical subjects in binary terms, cannot
give a voice to subjects that exist, socially, outside a traditional binary
structure.73 Here is the crux of what Jean F. Lyotard labels “the
differend,” that is,
the case where the plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and
becomes for that reason a victim. If the addressor, the addressee,
and the sense of the testimony are neutralized, everything takes
place as if there were no damages [ ]. A case of differend
between two parties takes place when the ‘regulation’ of the
conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the
parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in
that idiom.74
This silence is precisely what is at stake when the law cannot effectively
“hear” a subject. The law does not oppress the non-binary subject, so
much as it does not empower it to verbalize its needs and interests.75
The language of the non-binary exists outside the “establishment
procedure,”76 and thus becomes only silence. The experience of a
subject that is divested of speech as a result of not speaking the language
of the law is of particular interest because the lived experience is
bifurcated between the law that imposes an ulterior identity onto the
subject, one that is un-relatable, and a lived experience that substantially
differs from that identity.77

II. THE POLITICIZED AND BINARY-BASED NATURE OF IDENTITY IN
LAW
This section discusses the politicized nature of binary-based
identity and its relationship to the binary in the law. Politicized identity
is premised on a basic binary basis.78 Formal identity-based groups such
as the National Council of La Raza or the NAACP create, to some
73

Id.
JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE 9 (GeorgesVan
Den Abbeele, trans., Univ. Minn. Press 1988) (1983).
75
Id. at 10.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
See Mary Bernstein, Identity Politics, 31 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 47, 56, 62 (2005).
74
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extent, exclusive political enclaves based on a shared racial or ethnic
history, traits, and/or culture, that are defined vis-à-vis an Other.
Politicized identity, itself a creature of history and culture, though
distinct from legal identity, has been utilized by the courts to adjudicate
cases and controversies that hinge on identity classifications.79 The
question is not whether there is disconnect between identity based on
lived experience and legal identity, but rather how radical the break is
between the two. Turning to the question of how one experiences social
identity, it is useful to draw from Martin Heidegger’s essay concerned
with how one “dwells”80 as a subject. Applying this framework to
understand how a subject experiences its politicized identity, and how
that identity manifests in the law, provides additional insight into our
inquiry. This section thus examines how the binary informs the present
politics of identity, and how traditional binary-based identity signifiers
continue to provide a framework for and insight into how identity and
history impact dwelling in the present age.
In the context of exploring a subject’s lived experience outside
of a juridical structure, Heidegger’s analysis of “dwelling”81 is
particularly pertinent. The central question of dwelling is how a subject
manifests in law and policy within a continuously evolving
sociocultural and historical context.82 Dwelling is, to a large extent,
sociocultural and historical in nature, and the foregoing actively shape
the dwelling space within which a subject is defined, and sets the limits
and possibilities of a subject’s perception and interpretation.83 For
example, the idea of race, especially the legal definition of who is Black
or Hispanic, emerges throughout various historical contexts—religious
notions of race to scientific notions that have given way to a primarily
sociocultural definition of race.84 The various structural components of
identity, e.g., culture, race, ethnicity, gender, ideology, and geography,

79

Id.
See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Building Dwelling Thinking, in POETRY, LANGUAGE,
THOUGHT 141–60 (Albert Hofstadter, trans., 1971).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See Bernstein, supra note 78.
80
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are all inextricably linked as the background, the dwelling, from which
a subject emerges and resides in.85
Ultimately, a subject dwells within its culture, which provides a
behavioral system for a subject to interpret and define the world. Culture
is the qualitative basis for the variability explaining how subjects dwell
in an identity space, and how judges arrive at very different
interpretations of the law. Culture lays the foundation for action,
conduct, strategies, and thought, which finds ultimate expression in
policy.86 In the case of identity-based cases and controversies, the courts
have approached various identity-based statuses, such as race, ethnicity,
and national origin, from a cultural lens; the constitutional and legal
reasoning employed and conclusions reached are tinctured with a
culturally informed binary.87 Culture can be conceived as a conceptual
catalogue that catalogues possible interpretations of an experience, and
political culture as a subset that itemizes the political dimension of
experience.88 Depending on the cultural legacy inherited by a particular
society, social subjects will have an inventory of possible courses of
action from which to choose.89 The inventory of options contributes to
identity, to what someone is or is not.90 Groups and individuals grasp
and comprehend their “essence,” distinctive identity, by identifying

See Paul Harrison, “How shall I say it…?” Relating the Non-Relational, 39 ENV’T
the elements of the self in relation to
suffering).
86
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a state statutory
scheme to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial
classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (holding
that a prosecutor's peremptory challenges of Latino jurors based on doubts about the
ability of such jurors to defer to official interpreter’s translation of Spanish-language
testimony did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (holding that an equal protection of the laws is not directed
solely against discrimination between whites and blacks; exclusion of eligible
persons from jury service solely because of their ancestry or national origin is
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment).
87
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 86.
88
See generally Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self:
Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REV. 224
(1991) (discussing how the view of self is influenced by culture).
89
Id. at 228.
90
See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, BASIC WRITINGS (Barry Stocker ed., 2007)
(providing select translations of Derrida’s seminal works on deconstruction).
85

AND PLAN. 590, 595 (2007) (discussing
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what they are not.91 Culture thus consists of what Clifford Geertz dubs
socially constructed “structures of meaning”92 that mediate the terms
that subjects of a polity utilize to situate, organize, and define
relationships between space, place, and identity.93 Knowledge is
effectively transmitted spatially, temporally, via a cultural
superstructure.94 Culture thus effectively constrains rationality, so as to
produce variegated sub-sets of perception and interest articulation in the
realm of identity politics and law.95
The binary is so pervasive that it structures meta-discourse and
narratives across various dimensions, e.g., identity, ideology, and
politics.96 The binary has been effective in providing the courts with a
mechanism by which to effectively adjudicate cases and controversies
that are identity-based. “[B]inaries serve as crucial legitimating
reference points in the vocabulary”97 of the courts in positing law that
then informs and delineates policy. Court opinions, the textual products
of interpretation, provide such reference points. The Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution—from Plessy98 to Brown99

91

Id.
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 12–13
(1973).
93
Id.
94
See generally RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE AND MATERIALISM (rev. ed. 2006)
(examining the role of power structures in setting culture and disseminating ideas).
95
See Michael Walzer, On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought, 82 POL.
SCI. Q. 191, 194 (1967); SUSANNE K. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY (3d ed.
1957) (describing the interrelationship between cultural norms and expressions and
perceptions of reality).
96
See, e.g., Karen A. Cerulo, Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions, 23
ANN. REV. OF SOC. 385 (1997) (discussing the shift from the “me” focus to a
context-based analysis in sociological research); Nancy Leong, Identity
Entrepreneurs, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1333 (2016) (discussing how individuals derive
value form association with various binary groups).
97
Cyrus Tata, Sentencing as Craftwork and the Binary Epistemologies of the
Discretionary Decision Process, 16 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 425, 448 (2007).
98
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that separate but equal facilities
did not violate the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments).
99
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturned Plessy v.
Ferguson holding that separate educational facilities are not equal).
92
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(White/Black
binary),
Hardwick100
to
Lawrence101
(Heterosexual/Homosexual binary), for instance—is a manner of
initiating “new” conceptual frameworks for comprehending legal
actuality. The aforementioned opinions are exemplars of judicial
opinions as a form of policy, and how opinions can retain high degrees
of continuity but can also accommodate “change” vis-à-vis
circumstances. Applying a cultural lens to identity, law, and policy
better equips one to identify and gauge the influence of the varied
cognitive maps that anchor and encapsulate thought and possibility, as
utilized by interpreters such as Judge Thompson in her dissent in
Kosilek.102
Court opinions, as expositions of truth, are, among other things,
interpretations that seek to provide answers that are “part of a much
larger network or system of questions and answers and further questions
instead of being merely discrete self-contained units of information.”103
Behavior does not take place in a vacuum; in the case of interpretation,
culture exerts a gravitational pull, so to speak, on the interminable ebb
and flow of the meaning of identity in the law.104 Identity (and policy)
not only reflects the values, norms, content, and character of the
interpreter, but more importantly the cultural superstructure that
informs policy.105 Court opinions establish a corpus of truth, a regime
of truth based on knowledge that the courts apply and obtain through
the interpretive process.106 Opinions constitute a textual and ideational
structure upon which meaning is produced and produces.107 Culture
serves to define, anchor, legitimate, and contextualize interpretation.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (overturning the lower court’s decision
and holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
protect homosexual sex even in the privacy of one’s bedroom).
101
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning Bowers v. Hardwick
holding that the court should not criminalize acts in relationships outside of injury or
abuse).
102
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014) (arguing that deference was due
to the district court judge in a case concerning the denial of sex reassignment surgery
to an inmate).
103
DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, OBLIVION 131 (2004). See also J. B. Ruhl, Law's
Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 888 (2008).
104
Ruhl, supra note 103, at 888.
105
See id.
106
See, e.g., Jessica Knouse, From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics, 2009 UTAH
L. REV. 749, 750 (2009).
107
Id.
100
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Interpretation and resultant policy are emplaced within culture, and are,
among other things, expressions of the cultural orientations of an elite
that exercises power in the legal context.108 Culture has explanatory
power when analyzing law and policy because it encompasses a
“‘complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law,
Custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a
member of society’ . . . [C]ulture . . . manifest[s] in customs, in beliefs,
and in forms of government.’”109 It is in this context that culture is the
foundation that grounds the binary structure, while also privileging one
term over the other (e.g., White/Black, Male/Female).110
III. THE INTEGRATED BINARY: LEGAL DISCOURSE, IDENTITY, AND
THE JURIDICAL SUBJECT

108

See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270–71 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding a
district court ruling that an employer's policy requiring employees to speak English
only while at work did not violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibition against
national origin discrimination). A “person who speaks only one tongue or to a person
who has difficulty using another language than the one spoken in his home, language
might well be an immutable characteristic like skin color, sex or place of birth.
However, the language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a particular
time is by definition a matter of choice . . . We do not consider rules that turn on the
language used in an employee's home, the one he chooses to speak when not at work
or the tongue spoken by his parents or grandparents. In some circumstances, the
ability to speak or the speaking of a language other than English might be equated
with national origin, but this case concerns only a requirement that persons capable
of speaking English do so while on duty. That this rule prevents some employees,
like Mr. Garcia, from exercising a preference to converse in Spanish does not
convert it into discrimination based on national origin. Reduced to its simplest, the
claim is ‘others like to speak English on the job and do so without penalty. Speaking
Spanish is very important to me and is inherent in my ancestral national origin.
Therefore, I should be permitted to speak it and the denial to me of that preference so
important to my self-identity is statutorily forbidden.’ The argument thus reduces
itself to a contention that the statute commands employers to permit employees to
speak the tongue they prefer. We do not think the statute permits that interpretation,
whether the preference be slight or strong or even one closely related to self-identity.
Mr. Garcia and the EEOC would have us adopt a standard that the employer's
business needs must be accomplished in the manner that appears to us to be the least
restrictive. The statute does not give the judiciary such latitude in the absence of
discrimination.” Id.
109
Robert C. Tucker, Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society, 88 POL.
SCI. Q. 173, 173 (1973) (internal citation omitted).
110
Id.
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A. Carolene Products’ Footnote Four and Concretizing the
Binary
Binaries continue to shape the courts’ approach to identity.111
To undermine traditional notions of a legal binary identity is to blur the
lines between the present and the past—to recognize the historical
subjectivity of one’s now and to destabilize the basis upon which an
entire jurisprudence has been built.112 The Court’s Footnote Four in
United States v. Carolene Products Co. is a vivid exemplar of law
reflecting and reifying an historically based identity binary in the form
of “discrete and insular minorities.”113 Such minorities, analytically and
legally speaking, have pervaded the law; conceptually, they embody a
legal-rational construct that permeates legal actuality as produced by
court interpretation and opinions.114 The binary has thus been the basis
of the most “progressive” innovations in law and policy emanating from
the bench.115 In light of this, it seems paradoxical and problematic that
the political and public policy realms are reflecting a rejection of the
very basis that the law has employed to protect groups that have faced
historical discrimination, violence, and exclusion from full and
substantive participation in the polity.

111

See generally Julie A. Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex
Categories: A Comparison of the Multiracial and Transgendered Experience, 39
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917, 942 (2002) (discussing how the binaries present in race
classifications systems can provide solutions for the current gender binaries).
112
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (“[N]o judicial
system could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that it
raised . . . the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution
requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition,
indispensable.” (internal citations omitted)).
113
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
114
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that “racebased affirmative action programs, “imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642–46 (1973) (holding that aliens are a
discrete and insular minority and therefore a statute barring aliens public
employment on basis of citizenship).
115
See CARLOS BALL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUALITY, GENDER
IDENTITY, AND THE LAW (6th ed. 2016); DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER,
RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES 14–15 (2003) (explaining the negative impact of the tendency to
consider those with disabilities to be a homogenous class).
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One of the most famous footnotes in United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence, i.e., Footnote Four from Carolene Products,116
captures the entrenchment of the binary. It is, in Justice Powell’s words,
“the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law.”117 Although
Footnote Four did not give rise to the binary nor mark the prominent
moment when the Court embedded a binary framework into its
jurisprudence,118 it does mark a very clear moment in time when the
binary is explicitly articulated as being an integral part of the genesis of
modern equal protection jurisprudence and clarifies the juridical subject
in the context of Court interpretation.119 The Court ponders, in Footnote
Four, “whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry.”120 Footnote Four becomes the self-referential basis
upon which, among other things, the Court has based its tiered scrutiny
framework, and adjudges the manner in which a right translates into a
constitutional protection.121
Although Footnote Four is multidimensional, it is important to
keep in mind “the fact that the Carolene Products Footnote is about
values.”122 The primary value that Footnote Four memorializes is that
of the Court’s power to review legislation to further the protection of
minority rights—minorities that are viewed in and derive protection
from a basic binary basis.123 The binary is one that can be characterized
116

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “Carolene Products” Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087,
1087 (1982).
118
See e.g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) & Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S.
536, 541 (1926) (using the Black/White binary to find that a party cannot exclude
blacks from voting in its primary); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925) (Private/Public binary to hold that states cannot require children to attend
public, rather than parochial, schools). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
401 (1923) (relying on a Citizen Nationalist/Alien Foreigner binary to find that states
cannot forbid the teaching of a foreign language).
119
See e.g., cases cited supra note 118.
120
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
121
See Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position of
Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 277, 283 (1995).
122
Id. at 302.
123
Id. at 284–85.
117
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as positing “insiders” and “outsiders” within the law and, by
implication, in the greater societal context.124 The identity-based binary
is thus the fulcrum upon which courts are able to determine insideroutsider status and to apply the law accordingly.125
Granted, “discrete,” “insular,” and “minorities” are not
explicitly defined, nor is it clear what kind of “prejudice” said
“minorities”126 must be subject to trigger judicial protection. A
reasonable interpretation of the terms, as used in the Footnote, is that
the minority groups to whom it refers to
are not able to play their proper role in democratic politics. They
are “discrete” in the sense that they are separate in some way,
identifiable as distinct from the rest of society. They are
“insular” in the sense that other groups will not form coalitions
with them—and, critically, not because of a lack of common
interests but because of “prejudice.”127
Various jurists and parties to lawsuits have construed Footnote
Four to encompass sundry groups as “discrete and insular minorities”
entitled to judicial protection.128 For example, relying upon Footnote

124

See. e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the Inside-Outsider,
134 U. PA L. REV. 1291, 1293 (1986).
125
See id. at 1316–19.
126
See Dunnavant, supra note 23.
127
David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251,
1257 (2010).
128
See, e.g., Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 (1976) (arguing that illegitimate
children were a suspect class and therefore classifications that disadvantaged them
should be subject to strict scrutiny); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432, 461–65 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that mentally retarded
persons have been subjected to a long history of discrimination and should be
viewed as a suspect class); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 144–45 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that legislative classifications that discriminate on
the basis of poverty are “suspect” and demand “exacting judicial scrutiny”);
Rowland v. Mad River Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1012–17 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.) (arguing that homosexuals constitute a significant
and insular minority of this country’s population, and that discrimination has in fact
deprived this group of fundamental rights); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313 (1976) (stating that “old age does not define a ‘discrete and insular’
group”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(concluding that residents of poorer school districts were not “relegated to such a
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Four in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,129 the Court held
that
when the State’s allocation of power places unusual burdens on
the ability of racial groups to enact legislation specifically
designed to overcome the “special condition” of prejudice, the
governmental action seriously “curtail[s] the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities.” In a most direct sense, this implicates the judiciary’s
special role in safeguarding the interests of those groups that are
“relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.”130
It seems, therefore, that binary-based identity has been key in the
application of Footnote Four’s interpretative framework.
A list of such physical/behavioral trait-based minorities
“arguably includes not only groups defined in terms of race and national
origin,”
but
also
Sane/Mentally
Ill,
Rich/Poor,
Heterosexual/Homosexual, and Adult/Child.131 The Carolene Products
identity-based binary in Footnote Four utilizes and reaffirms the binary
as the base of recognition, reasoning, interpretation, and adjudication.132
When articulated in 1938, race was perhaps the clearest, preeminent
binary-based identity signifier that the Court (and the lower federal and
state courts) could emplace within Footnote Four’s interpretive
architecture.133 In light of Reconstruction and the Post-Reconstruction
South’s implementation of Jim Crow laws, the Black/White binary,
which could readily be distilled from the historical experience of both
races, fit into the “discrete and insular”134 criteria of Footnote Four,
thereby triggering judicial scrutiny and protection. As construed by the
Court, equal protection has been squarely built upon a binary-based

position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process”).
129
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982).
130
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
131
Brilmayer, supra note 124, at 1295.
132
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
133
Id.
134
Brilmayer, supra note 124, at 1295.

Astrada & Astrada

198

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 17:2

edifice; the binary was and remains key to making sense of legal facts,
the law, and its application.135
B. Beyond Footnote Four
Footnote Four has become part of a larger legal meta-discourse
on how the Court will view identity, generally speaking, and this of
course impacts lower federal and state courts as well. The Court’s
employment of binary-based identity signifiers is part of a long history
of race-conscious legislation and judicial opinions.136 The modern
manifestation of affirmative action, for instance, which began with the
Philadelphia Plan137 in the late 1960s and has been the basis of racial
identity-based cases such as Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,138 Metro

See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory
purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences. It implies that the decision-maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” (internal citation omitted)).
136
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 118.
137
See Nicholas Pedriana & Robin Stryker, Political Culture Wars 1960s Style:
Equal Employment Opportunity–Affirmative Action Law and the Philadelphia Plan,
103 AM. J. SOC. 633, 635 (1997). The 1969 Philadelphia Plan has been described as
“‘the first effective use of affirmative action to implement civil rights legislation
directing employers to guarantee equal employment opportunity.’ As the first highly
visible federal government affirmative action initiative in the wake of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Philadelphia Plan crystallized arguments of both
affirmative action’s early opponents and its early supporters. Just as past policies
shaped how both sides crafted their arguments about the Philadelphia Plan, these
arguments and their resolution fed forward to help shape later government
employment policy.” Id.
138
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
135
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Broad. Inc. v. FCC,139 and United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,140 is
thoroughly steeped in binary-based identity. Binary-based identity has
been the basis for articulating, examining, discussing, debating,
arguing, and impassioned contestation over what constitutes
correct/proper law and policy.141 It is an indispensable part of the
legislative and interpretive process.
In the case of the binary-based identity signifier, despite its
simplification of complex reality, it has managed to remain a viable
aspect of the legal enterprise in adjudicating cases and controversies
because, despite the artificial nature of dyadic frameworks, as the Court
noted long ago, “[c]ontroversies have arisen and will no doubt arise
again in respect of the proper classification of individuals in border line
cases.”142 Indeed, the binary has proven resilient in the face of
progressive change, and has been (and can be) maintained to retain the
status quo regarding identity-based signifiers. For example, in Gong
Lum v. Rice,143 the Court, in affirming an example of segregation based
on race, declared that
[m]ost of the cases cited arose, it is true, over the establishment
of separate schools as between white pupils and black pupils;
139

Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552–53 (1990), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995). Justice Brennan’s majority
opinion declared: “We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by
Congress—even if those measures are not 'remedial' in the sense of being designed
to compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination—are
constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental
objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.” Id. at 564–65. For an example of gender and its binary nature,
see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.”).
140
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (analyzing
Title VII, the Court declared that, it “would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a
Nation’s concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of
those who had ‘been excluded from the American dream for so long’ constituted the
first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish
traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.”).
141
See, e.g., Greta Fowler Snyder, Multivalent Recognition: Between Fixity and
Fluidity in Identity Politics, 74 THE J. OF POL. 249, 251 (2012); Rogers Brubaker &
Frederick Cooper, Beyond “Identity,” 29 THEORY & SOC. 1, 3 (2000).
142
Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922).
143
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
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but we cannot think that the question [of the legality of
segregation] is any different, or that any different result can be
reached, assuming the cases above cited to be rightly decided,
where the issue is as between white pupils and the pupils of the
yellow races.144
Courts that have construed the law to step significantly outside
of the traditional identity-based binaries have been met with resistance.
In the case of Kosilek v. Spencer,145 discussed supra, its reversal by the
First Circuit146 could be recast in terms of protecting and reifying the
sex/gender binary that is essential to the continuity that has undergirded
how the law conceives and interprets legal protections for identity
groups, especially “discrete and insular minorities.”147 The tension and
dissonance between the district court’s legal reasoning and conclusions
and the appellate court’s reasoning and conclusions may point to the
“collective anxiety in our culture surrounding gender, and anyone who
may bring light to the inadequacy of the gender binary, by blurring the
lines between ‘male’ and ‘female.’”148 Judge Thompson, in her dissent
also directly confronts the conflict between the integrity of the binary
and challenges to its usage in grounding the law’s approach to identitybased signifiers and the judicial provision of remedies and
protections.149 Judge Thompson contends that the majority’s opinion
“aggrieves an already marginalized community, and enables
correctional systems to further postpone their adjustment to the
crumbling gender binary.”150 In the case of the sex/gender binary:
It is widely accepted in the dominant culture that there are two
sexes and two genders and no room for anything in between. We
organize our daily interactions, our values, our social
institutions, the law, our very understanding of reality, around
these assumptions. One is not fully cognizable as human without
a designation as male or female. The categories of sex and
gender and the differences we ascribe to them are legitimized
144

Id. at 87.
See supra note 24.
146
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
147
Id.
148
Dunnavant, supra note 23, at 18.
149
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 96-113 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
150
Id. at 113 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
145
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through naturalizing them, insisting that they are based on real,
inevitable differences and thus go unquestioned. Yet as gender
theorists have long known, this binary system is not natural, but
socially and politically constructed.151
Kosilek v. Spencer points to the contest that is taking place in the realms
of law and policy between time-tested binaries and the stability and
“objective” basis they provide vis-à-vis identity signifiers.152 The case
exemplifies the challenges based on fluidity and inclusiveness that the
binary eschews by its dyadic nature of making complex states of affairs
more manageable for the purpose of pragmatic and prudential
management of the administration of justice.153
When moving beyond the binary, certain subjects and groups
may experience serious cognitive dissonance as to what is believed
about the world and one’s place in it—as well as conceptions of Self,
Other, and World.154 What defines the ethos and essence of what it
means to be and why, may also be called into question for those same
groups. With the introduction of alternative voices, interpretations,
worldviews, and experiences, the simplified binary becomes subject to
destabilization. When “one recognizes the emergence of multiple
different voices—including … feminist, critical race, and more
recently, gay and lesbian theorists—then modernist claims to identify

151

Dunnavant, supra note 23, at 20. See also JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 147 (1999) (discussing how the
repeated naming of sexual differences creates the appearance of an organic sexuality
regarding a binary of Male/Female). For a discussion of the relationship between
sex, inter-sexed, and law and policy, see Sara R. Benson, Hacking The Gender
Binary Myth: Recognizing Fundamental Rights For The Inter-Sexed, 12 CARDOZO
J.L. & GENDER 31 (2005).
152
See generally Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CAL. L. REV. 799 (2015)
(identifying and describing the phenomenon of “formal identity,” in which the law
recognizes those identities individuals claim for themselves by executing
formalities); Clarissa R. Hayward & Ron Watson, Identity and Political Theory, 33
WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y. 9 (2010) (discussing strong multiculturalism, liberal
multiculturalism, and the Foucaultian view in identity politics).
153
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 63–96.
154
See CHARLES TAYLOR, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM:
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25–51, 56–58, 60–73 (1994).
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essential truths and ground knowledge on firm foundations become
highly problematic.”155
In the case of race, the basic binary that undergirds identity
signifiers that the courts utilize to conceptualize and build a
jurisprudential edifice that has, at its core, a racial dyad within which
racial identity is ensconced, contours and delimits explanation and
understanding of racial identity.156 The binary is significant because it
provides an abridged and selective field of perception and interpretation
that becomes the basis of what race is, what it means, and what will it
encompass as far as legal reasoning and judicial resolution of cases and
controversies that have an identity-basis upon which results depend.157
The racial binary
shapes our understanding of what race and racism mean and the
nature of our discussions about race. It is crucial, therefore, to
identify and describe [the binary] and to demonstrate how it
binds and organizes racial discourse, limiting both the scope and
the range of legitimate viewpoints in that discourse.”158
In the context of racial identity and the binary framework within
which it has been emplaced, the law has relied very heavily upon the
Black/White identity signifier, to the point where other people of color
such as Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans may (or appear to) drop
out, and all that remains is an unadulterated Black/White binary for
assessing redress and protections for the historically oppressed and
exploited.159 Yet, other people of color and other groups deemed
racially Other have suffered the same effects of race-based genocide
(e.g., Native Americans), prejudice and discrimination in every aspect
155

STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 159 (2000).
156
See cases cited infra notes 162–67.
157
Id.
158
Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science”
of American Racial Thought, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1213, 1214 (1998) [hereinafter Perea,
The Black/White Binary].
159
See generally Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Embracing the Tar-Baby LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 499 (2015) (reflecting
on LatCrit theory and identifying submerged themes); Athena D. Mutua, Shifting
Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the Black/White
Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177 (1999) (reflecting on and critiquing LatCrit
theory).
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of their lives (e.g., Chinese), internment (e.g., Japanese), and prejudicial
immigration polices (e.g., Irish, Latinos).160 Yet, the Black/White
binary has been the basis of “landmark” legal opinions that have altered
the fabric of law and policy in the 20th century.161 For example, a
plethora of cases, from Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada,162 Sipuel v.
Board of Regents,163 Sweatt v. Painter,164 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents,165 to Brown v. Board of Education,166 are premised
exclusively on the Black/White binary.
Each of the above cases, jointly and severally, has contributed
to re-conceptualizing the law’s view of disparate treatment and the
judicial role in protecting identity groups, generally speaking. Although
the Court has applied judicial remedies and protections to other racial
identity groups—such as the case of Hernandez v. Texas167 (wherein the
Court held that Mexican-Americans and other nationality-based identity
groups in the US were entitled to equal protection of the law under the
Fourteenth Amendment)—the basic binary structure is still employed

160

See, e.g., DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1971) (documenting “a narrative of the conquest
of the American west as the [Native Americans] experienced it.”);
CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (exploring the ChineseAmerican experience and use of the legal system to fight discrimination); ANDREA
GEIGER, SUBVERTING EXCLUSION: TRANSPACIFIC ENCOUNTERS WITH RACE, CASTE,
AND BORDERS, 1885-1928 (2015) (discussing Japanese and other Asian’s experience
with immigration); NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (2009)
(discussing the historical events that lead to the Irish being considered white in the
U.S.).
161
Perea, The Black/White Binary, supra note 158, at 156. Struggles “over the legal
status of Blacks have been central in shaping the Constitution and the Supreme
Court's decisions on race and equality. All the civil rights enactments and court
decisions deemed major in this area have sought to redress harms to Blacks. The
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments abolished slavery and race discrimination in
voting, respectively. The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment established
federal and state citizenship for Blacks, reversing the Dred Scott decision. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted principally to protect
the civil equality of the newly freed slaves from hostile state action.” Id. at 155.
162
305 U.S. 337 (1938).
163
332 U.S. 631 (1948).
164
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
165
339 U.S. 637 (1950).
166
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
167
347 U.S. 475 (1954).
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in modified form, such as White/Non-White.168 The basic integrity of
the binary is preserved and further utilized to make sense of and resolve
legal cases and controversies that are identity-based in nature.
In Hernandez, the Court declared that the “Fourteenth
Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a ‘twoclass theory’—that is, based upon differences between ‘white’ and
‘Negro.’”169 Describing some of the racial prejudice and discrimination
faced by Mexican-Americans at the time, the Court stated that the
testimony of . . . officials and citizens contained the admission
that residents of the community distinguished between ‘white’
and ‘Mexican.’ The participation of persons of Mexican descent
in business and community groups was shown to be slight. Until
very recent times, children of Mexican descent were required to
attend a segregated school for the first four grades.170
Even where the historical White/Black binary is broadened to
include other races, the integrity of the binary is nonetheless preserved
to some significant degree, and the courts are able to expand protections
to the Other in such a schema.171 This dynamic seems to pervade the
courts’ approach to inclusiveness and diversity as far as expansion of
remedies and protections based on identity is concerned.172
IV. POWER DYNAMICS OF THE BINARY: HOW THE BINARY CONSTRUCTS
A TRUTH REGIME
The historical modernist binary that the law has employed is
based upon a classificatory schema that builds legal actuality from a
politicized construct that is the product of relations of power. The
historical or traditional binary creates a point on which identity-based
signifiers can be employed to settle legal cases and controversies that
involve decision-making processes being based on simplified identity-

168

See cases cited supra notes 162–67.
Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478.
170
Id. at 479 (internal citations omitted).
171
See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of
Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1297–96 (1982).
172
Id.
169
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based signifiers.173 A prominent example of this can be observed in
equal protection doctrine and law, which is identity-based
jurisprudence.174 Judicial remedies and protections rooted in equal
protection hinge
on the identity trait—such as race or gender—implicated by an
alleged act of discrimination. In those instances, the identity trait
stands in to represent a set of assumptions about the group it
describes: Because that group has been subjected to
discrimination or politically marginalized in the past, or because
its identifying characteristic is irrelevant to its members’ ability
to contribute to or participate in society, the law is particularly
sensitive to state action that targets such groups.175
A definitive counterpoint therefore emerges in the law
concerning identity-based signifiers. For example, the Court has posited
and built upon a racial basis176 for upholding177 or modifying178 the legal
understanding of race-based educational access policies. The federal
courts (as well as state courts) are bound by the binaries that the
Supreme Court employs to expound upon what the Constitution
means.179 The employment of the binary-based identity signifier thus
enables a power dynamic to emerge that creates a space that is at once
173

See Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1805
(2000). “Racism must not be understood as a set of practices that targets a group
because of some preexisting characteristic of its members, but instead as a set of
practices that establishes racial hierarchy and assigns individuals to distinctive
statuses within that hierarchy.” Id. Racial identity—defining and applying it—is a
product and producer of power.
174
See Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1162, 1179–80 (1977).
175
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Identity as Proxy, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1605, 1607 (2015).
176
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that
state laws establishing separate public schools for black and white students is
unconstitutional and overruling the Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) doctrine
of “separate but equal”).
177
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the affirmative action
admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School and declaring that the
Law School had a compelling interest in promoting class diversity).
178
See Regents of the Univ. of. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (upholding
affirmative action, allowing race to be one of several factors in a college admission
policy, but also holding that racial quotas were unconstitutional).
179
See cases cited supra notes 176–78.
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determined by, and determines, identity structures as they are
manifested in a subject’s actions and thoughts as they enter the realms
of law, policy, and institutions. “[I]n using identity as its organizing
principle, law is confined to operating within the very structures that
subordinate and is similarly confined to focusing on the product rather
than the cause of inequality.”180
The binary has thus been and continues to be the site where the
courts construct legal identity.181 It is also the site where the political
contestation for the power to define identity takes place, and thus has a
formative effect on how law conceptualizes, processes, and adjudicates
cases and controversies. The political and legal dimensions of the binary
thus establish the binary as a fulcrum wherein limits are set as to how
an identity manifests in law and society.182 That there is a call for
moving “Beyond He/She”183 provides a clear example of how a
traditional identity signifier (Male/Female) is being undermined,
destabilized, and ultimately how attempts are being made to dispense
with the binary that has structured law and policy. The law, however,
despite the pitfalls that attach from subscribing to the binary, has relied
upon the basic binary to establish legal schema to protect identity, to
remedy violations of law based on specific identity signifiers. 184 The
persistence of the binary, despite calls to blur or discard the identity
signifiers that create an enclosed and identifiable identity space, is
illustrative of the complex processes that are at work in the evolution of
thought pertaining to identity and the configuration of identity politics
and the law.185 Yet it seems that those who rail against the identity
signifier dwell within the structures of the Other, in law, society, and
identity politics as construed by the modernist identity signifier.

180

Lucas, supra note 175, at 1608.
See ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR. & NANCY LEVIT, Un-Natural Things: Constructions
of Race, Gender, and Disability, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL
RACE THEORY 173 (Francisco Valdez et al. eds., 2002) (stating that the Supreme
Court, in many cases, considers the physical differences between men and women in
making its decisions).
182
See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 175, at 1627 (arguing that categorizing identity in the
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contexts).
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The foregoing presents a central question: how can (or rather,
should) the law go forward with identity-based signifiers without
importing the negative trappings of said signifiers? Similarly, how can
the law adapt or reconfigure identity-based signifiers, which are the
basis of equal protection law,186 among other realms of law and practice,
so that the courts can fashion a pragmatic and prudential mechanism
that can withstand change and that transcends the historicity of identitybased signifiers that serve as benchmarks for measuring progress? The
identity signifier appears to be at odds with political and sociocultural
efforts to undermine and discard the binaries that have permeated
modern law and history. In the case of the standard racial binary of
Black/White, for instance, one commentator contends that,
[t]here are at least three reasons, however, why an exclusive
focus on Blacks and Whites is not justified. First, it is important
to work to eradicate all racism, not just the racism experienced
by Blacks. Second, it is wrong to assume that racism against
[other racial identity groups such as Latinos is] simply a less . .
. virulent form of the same racism experienced by Blacks. . . .
Finally, our national demographics are changing
significantly.187
In the case of the traditional racial binary of White/Black, for instance,
some commentators contend that
[t]he Court has considered race to be the principal protected
characteristic under the Constitution. The Court has, therefore,
encouraged an underinclusive, binary discourse about race in
which the primary views expressed are the white and the [black]
. . . We are a long way from . . . legal discourse that includes all
the voices that must be heard.188
The binary, whether or not one agrees with the foregoing contention,
remains the basis upon which the law is or is not able to conceive and
186

Id. at 1618.
Perea, The Black/White Binary, supra note 158, at 167.
188
Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary
Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 571, 573 (1995) [hereinafter Perea, Ethnicity
and the Constitution].
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incorporate a juridical subject into preexisting legal-rational constructs
to adjudicate and administer justice.189
There perhaps is a growing frustration with attempts to find and
posit identities that can clearly encompass relevant and unique criteria,
such as the discrete and insular qualities or traits of a group, that neatly
ties together such traits with an identity that the law can then act on and
build upon.190 Before the law, one has to be Either/Or, one or the
other.191 A juridical subject stands before the law as a legal subject
infused with a binary nature: in criminal matters, one can only be
“guilty” or “not guilty,” in civil matters one’s claim is found credible or
dismissed. In effect, the binary re-imagines the subject and the case or
controversy as “rational and orderly but obscure[s] the power
mediations at play.”192 The binary has become inextricably integrated
into the process “of converting individuals and circumstances to
cases”193 so that the courts may engage and participate in the metanarratives of politicized identity that structure the binary-based identity
signifier. In the Slaughter House Cases,194 when considering the
Reconstruction Amendments, that is, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments, the Court stated,
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this
protection . . . Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the
mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it
forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican
peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop
slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this
amendment may safely be trusted to make it void. And so if
other rights are assailed by the States which properly and
necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that

189

Id.; Lucas, supra note 175, at 1619 (noting that the current legal construction of
equal protection is based on general categories of identity).
190
See Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 573 (arguing that
the law’s current racial discrimination paradigm is inadequate adequately to
encompass ethnicity).
191
Id.
192
Jennifer Lee, Binary Determination of Guilt or Innocence: Reading Between the
Lines of People v. Du, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 181, 183 (2003).
193
Tata, supra note 97, at 428.
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83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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protection will apply, though the party interested may not be of
African descent.195
Yet, even when the binary is expanded, that is, stretched beyond its
initial formulation, the underlying base and resultant conversion of
subjects into juridical subjects remains.196 For example, the
White/Black binary, even though it has been expanded to include other
races/ethnicities, retains its reductionist character and cultural
understanding of politicized identity. The Black identity signifier as it
has been construed in the law since the founding of the U.S. in the larger
White/Black binary continues to inform key terms and rules of
formation such as prejudice, discrimination, hate speech, and racial
animus.197 The binary has thus proven resilient – despite its pitfalls. It
seems that, despite efforts to make identity more fluid, porous, less
exclusive in nature, the law requires some degree of the opposite of the
foregoing to maintain its ability to adjudicate identity-based cases.
Herein lies the rub. What is or should be the fate of the binary going
forward?
CONCLUSION
The law and the courts, generally speaking, treat identity in a
similar fashion: one either does or does not qualify for remedies,
protections, etc., of the law based on whether a subject fits or does not
fit into a legal identity signifier.198 Why are those the only alternatives?
Why can a subject not be neither or both? The law cultivates historically
based identity binaries when converting sociocultural and economic
realities into legal discourse. Subjects find themselves emplaced within
politicized binary identities; an identity is manufactured and given to
subjects by various elites, be it political, economic, social, or legal
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Id. at 72.
Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 608–11 (stating that,
despite expanding the equal protection clause to ethnicity, apparent court confusion
hampered “meaningful protection”).
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actors.199 A disconnect exists between the subject and history: if the
racial binary is undermined and subjects are free to choose their racial
identities and affiliations independent of whether or not a subject
possesses what was once the requisite experience that stems from a
racial identity signifier, then the law will find itself in a predicament. It
becomes a conflict surrounding the meaning of identity, rather than an
exercise of inclusion and giving voice and substance to an identity
group based on modernist-based identity signifiers. The problem with
retaining symbols of identity is that they are imprinted solely in an
historically lateral sense, as lynchpins of identity, devoid of the
historical culmination of social relationships.200 In discarding the
experiential elements that ground an identity signifier—and the
experiential dimension is by nature binary in that it is premised on a
this/that, either/or cognitive framework—what results is a detached and
exclusionary basis of identity that the subject cannot grasp.201
The contradictory nature of identity seems to be characterized
by the notion that there is and is not a center, a basis, for what one is.
Yet the law views actuality in terms of categories, classifications,
identity-based signifiers. The Self breathes life into the historical
structures of identity, so it is both historically determined and
irrefutably existential. To deconstruct binaries without discarding them,
i.e., to identify and explicitly acknowledge the deep effect that the
binary has and the serious distortions and limitations that are immanent
within it, we can begin a process of productively “destabilizing”
binaries. 202 “In so doing, these binaries can be recognized as dynamic
rather than static, fundamentally contingent rather than universal, and
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See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 175, at 1605 (stating that the Equal Protection
Clause’s use of identity as the basis of its doctrine can “force people to identify in a
particular way to lay claim to legal protection”).
200
See Charlie Gerstein, Comment, What Can the Brothers Malone Teach Us About
Fisher v. University of Texas?, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 97, 98–99
(2014) (stating that each state had a system for defining who was considered Black,
despite a person’s contrary self-identification); see also Andrés Acebo, Life, Liberty
& the Pursuit of Whiteness: A Revolution of Identity Politics in America, 2 COLUM.
J. RACE & L. 149, 153–54 (2012) (noting that the Court in Ozawa v. United States,
260 U.S. 178 (1922) stated that absent clearly classifying people by race would
create problematic racial overlap).
201
See Lucas, supra note 175, at 1627 (noting that legal identity categories are
“inherently exclusionary” and result in over-simplification).
202
Tata, supra note 97, at 427.
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synergistic rather than discrete and oppositional . . . binaries are
revealed as fluid, mutable, and, protean.”203
The need for order, stability, clarity, and pragmatic and
functional bases upon which to adjudicate issues and administer justice
can be acknowledged without the trappings of objectivity that renders
the binary a rigid and overly artificial and distortionary construct.
Judicial opinions encompass “choice and order; implicit routine and
explicit normative principle; analysis and intuition; individualization
and consistency; rationality and emotion . . . These qualities co-exist
dynamically, are synergistic, and inhabit each other.”204 While it is
pragmatic and useful to construct notions such as binary identity to
create the illusion of concretized identity classifications, the world
filtered through such classifications reflects a model of a “real world”—
a model that is useful for dealing with the world but that is not in fact
reflective of any objective truths about the world.205 The model, the
binary, manufactures truth-value, but it is also subject, like all models
and constructs, to revision and reconfiguration. The contradictory
nature of identity, in the locus of a subject that shapes the world and is
shaped by it, may clear a space for accountability in the culturally
relativist landscape contoured by law and policy.
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